Portland State University

PDXScholar
Working Papers in Economics

Economics

3-15-2020

Working Paper No. 52, Some of the Profound Effects
of World War I on France
Zachary McKinster
Portland State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/econ_workingpapers
Part of the Economic History Commons, and the Economic Theory Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Citation Details
Mckinster, Zachary "Some of the Profound Effects of World War I on France, Working Paper No. 52",
Portland State University Economics Working Papers. 52. (15 March 2020) i + 16 pages + Appendix.

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Working
Papers in Economics by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. Please contact us if we can make this
document more accessible: pdxscholar@pdx.edu.

Some of the Profound Effects
of World War I on France
Working Paper No. 52
Authored by: Zachary

McKinster

A Contribution to the Working Papers of the
Department of Economics, Portland State University
Submitted for: EC 457, “American Economic History, 20th Century”
15 March 2020; i + 16 pages + Appendix
Prepared for: Professor John Hall
Abstract: This inquiry seeks to establish that World War I engendered profound
effects over the population, economy, and nation of France. The word ‘profound’
suggests significant and permanent changes affecting individuals, the society, and
the economy at large. Penetrating into France’s 20th century history through the
account of Louis Barthas, an infantry soldier, provides stark contrast to
‘conventional’ narratives through providing insights into some of the effects of
industrialized combat, thereby allowing for a deeper understanding of the traumas
suffered. Clarifying developments taking place in the French economy provides a
foundation for better understanding some of the effects of WWI. This inquiry
stresses that France, once a glorious and a dominant force in Europe, was
devastated by the war. This inquiry’s narrative describing the conditions of the
French population and economy is drawn from empirical evidence and is presented
in the Appendix, strongly suggesting the war’s profound effects on France, thereby
contributing towards a greater understanding of French social and economic
history in first half of the 20th century.
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This inquiry seeks to establish that World War I (WWI or ‘the War’)
engendered profound effects on France. In understanding the effects of war on a
country, it is first important to define ‘profound’. In this authors opinion
‘profound’ suggests a significant, permanent change in the people, the economy,
and a variety of observable data. Drawing observations from prewar France and
through taking account of one particular infantry soldier helps to provide a stark
contrast to the widely accepted WWI narratives that tend to herald a ‘strategic’
officer seeking glory and fighting for love of country. This account from an
enlisted man provides insights into the broad experience for the common soldier
throughout the four years of industrialized combat, allowing for a deeper
understanding of the trauma endured. The French economy provides a backdrop to
the effects of the war, before, during, and after. This inquiry seeks to emphasize
that the nation of France, once glorious and a dominant force in Europe, was
devastated in a monetary sense, but also through the destruction of factor
resources. After establishing a narrative or the French people and economy,
reference to the observable data adds depth to the profound effects on France.
These observations will ultimately lead to a greater understanding of French
history and that there never took place a true recovery after the War.
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The People of France and the ‘Poilu’: The Barrelmaker Louis Barthas
i) In order to understand early 20th Century France, it proves helpful to understand
members of the population. This can be achieved through examining the years
running up to WWI. In his essay The French Political Community Stanley
Hoffmann (1965, 16-21) teaches us that following the Franco-Prussian war in
1871, the newly formed Third Republic [of France] faced domestic tension
between nationalists and disruptive socialist workers. During the decades leading
up to the outbreak of WWI there suffered a stagnation in French ideology, and
there remained a fragile balance between the aristocrats, the bourgeoisie, and the
working class (the ‘petite bourgeoise’) in what is referred to as the ‘stalemate
society’. Even at odds, the stalemate between classes was generally accepted
because there was no real catalyst to force real change. Although disagreement
divided the French on the best direction for the country, all French lived by an
accepted set of values steeped in history and culture.
In his essay Social Change at the Grass Roots Laurence Wylie (1965, 225-230)
details the historical importance of the values observed in late 19th Century French
society and leading up the War Wylie’s analysis provides further insights and
understanding of the heroic character of the Frenchmen that would soon be
involved in the worst military conflagration the world had ever seen. The French
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people valued symbolism, individualism, and were fiercely loyal to family. Wylie
(1965, 231) describes ‘familles d’esprit’ (ideological families) which defines the
quintessential divisions in French society, and these families often dictated the
actions people would follow prior to the War. The French people notably valued
quality above all else, which further explains the staying power of the artisan class
within the middle-class bourgeoise, and the preference to pay a higher price than to
purchase cheap, mass produced commodities. These preferences would lead to
failures in production to meet the demands of war. These factors discussed allow
for a better grasp of what will take place during the war, and a closer look at one
individual’s experience will provide a possible foundation for what happens
afterwards.
ii) Louis Barthas was a French Barrelmaker, who would be considered an artisan
in this time period. He was also a self-proclaimed pacifist and socialist. In his
masterpiece Poilu [1978] Louis Barthas (2014, vii) offers insight into his
experience spanning the entirety of the War from 1914-1918 through his war
journals. Poilu translates literally to “hairy one” or dog face, which would become
the affectionate name for the French infantry solider. This image was largely based
upon theconstant stain of mud and grit that would coat the men and remain
throughout the war years. Tragically, Poilu finds himself at almost all of the
infamous battles, and his account is considered one of, if not the most, profound
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drawn from the War. His story helps to provide an often overlooked side of war,
and namely that like many of the fighting soldiers, he will bear witness to the
horrors of mechanized warfare, while holding conflicting views with his officers.
What can be learned is that these experiences contribute towards significant lasting
effects on French psyche, and therewith affect the French nation as a whole.
In August of 1914, immediately after the start of the War, Barthas (2014, 1-2) is
appalled at the public reception for the call to arms. He goes on to describe the
initial excitement and patriotism displayed by the crowds that gathered to send the
Frenchmen off to war via train transports as ‘unthinking’. Barthas (2014, 4-5)
describes that in waiting for his initial deployment the first wave of German
prisoners and French wounded would trickle off the trains. Townspeople are at first
receptive and congratulatory to the men who return wounded, but quickly turn sour
when overrun by sheer volume, unable to provide room or adequate services. In his
journals there is a continuous terror at the increasing speed with which men are
deployed into the War that appears to consumes all who enter, and how trench life
for the Poilu quickly leads to disillusionment and distrust of the officer class. This
distrust is a constant theme throughout Barthas account of the War, with distrust
shared by many of his comrades. Unsurprisingly, officers are overly represented by
France’s upper-class.
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iii) The distrust of officers among French infantryman was certainly well deserved.
Barthas (2014, 104) details the lack of provisions and disregard for human life
displayed by French leadership. He recounts the lack of drinkable water despite the
constant torrential downpours and being unable to drink from trenches filled with
water up to their chests. This frustration was certainly well-placed, but as the data
suggests, supplies are short and logistical challenges are often insurmountable. The
underlying suffering throughout the war can be attributed to the rise of
technological advances coupled with a humanity stuck in 19th Century strategic
thinking. Barthas (2014, 47) writes of the contrast between his childhood history
books, showing valiant officers waving French flags with sabers held high, and the
slaughter of German machine gun bullets ripping through men ceaselessly as they
were forced over the tops of trenches.
These scenes would reoccur countlessly throughout his many war journals, and
all the time he asks: “Where were the great leaders of the War were during such a
time.” Well into the War, prior to his experience at Verdun, Barthas (2014, 110111) explains that it was not patriotism, but simply force that led men to enter
these battlefields—and they were all victims. This ‘formidable machine’ was
grinding men up at a rate difficult for the human mind and emotion to comprehend.
When Barthas (2014, 193-213) finally enters Verdun, he refers to the approach as
‘entering the Charnel House’. His time in the ‘furnace’ was fraught with close-calls
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and an eye-witness account of the hellish realm that he found on this hilly range.
Once filled with forests and slopes, Verdun received more artillery fire than any
other area in the history of warfare. Shockingly, Barthas goes on to survive
Verdun, and proceeds to live through the War. On his release from service Barthas
(2014, 383) writes “I was free, after fifty-four months of slavery! I was finally
escaping from the claws of militarism, to which I swore such a ferocious hatred.”
He claimed that he would pass this hatred onto his children, and it appeared to be a
feeling shared by many of his generation.

The French Economy
i) In The Evolution of Economic Systems author Barry Clark ( 2015, 169) teaches
us that the period from 1815-1944 in France is characterized by ‘State Capitalism’.
As mentioned above, there was no industrial revolution in France to match the
pace of change that took place in America and Britain. It was only at the turn of the
20th century that French workers began to organize in groups, but this would not
last. This period of ‘industrial resistance’ is further characterized by a lack of
population increase. Clark (2015, 169) shows that while Germany’s population
increased by 250 percent during the 19th Century, France’s population increased at
but 40 percent. This can be attributed to France’s agricultural-based economy that
generated but meager wages for France’s workforce.
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Evidence is provided in an essay The French Economy authored by Charles P.
Kindleberger (1965, 135-136) that in 1913 France was in fact–despite lacking
industrial prowess–the leading manufacturer of automobiles, producing 45,000
custom cars that year. This single data point is indicative of the overall tone of the
French people prior to the War. Historians and economists may argue about the
speed, or lack thereof, that industrialization took place in France, but French
society ultimately indulged in an economy built from craftsmanship and the
individualism of its people. To the French, it was often considered more important
to pursue excellence and to produce high quality products than cheap commodities.
This characteristic persisted from 1815 after the Battle of Waterloo up to 1913, we
can find scant evidence of economic progress.
ii) It is often overlooked that another potential root cause for French prewar
stagnation could be related to its deeply fractured society. Clark (2015, 171)
reminding us that Karl Marx was powerfully influenced by French thinking during
the early 1840s, perhaps this tendency towards intellectualism and away from
pragmatism, helps to explain the poor functioning of the economic system during
the 19th century. Immediately before the War, the French economy had started to
show signs of progress and improvement. Wages were rising, and there was an
observable decrease in rates of unemployment. However, once the War got
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underway, the carnage released would consume more than bodies, it would also
consume the nation’s accumulation of wealth.
In his work Financing the First World War, author Hew Strachan (2014, 6)
touches on many of the underlying financial and economic drivers for all of the
countries involved in the War. We learn that in 1903 one third of the global gold
supply belonged to France, and they would use this supply to strengthen their
currency, the Franc, and at times to their own detriment. Allied countries would
seek to undermine France’s monetary ‘nationalism’ by requiring terms that were
unfavorable, or simply more favorable to British and American interests. Strachan
(2014, 40-42) explains that leading up to the War the Banque de France would
increase its fortune substantially, but once underway the French government would
place moratoriums as a way of excusing the bank and insurers of obligations made
unclear by war operations. The government would then put pressure on the bank to
create liquidity in the markets, following other countries down the path of price
increases and even crippling inflation.
France would become a major borrower, making use of American credit over
the War years. In the final phase of the War, many officials seemed to have lost all
control over budgetary and fiscal operations. Strachan (2014, 86-87) shows that
unfettered credit led to a ballooning of French debt, growing by 233,000 million
Francs from 1914-1919. This was unprecedented at the time, and the French tax
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system took in only 32,000 million Francs over the same period, well under what
could be considered adequate to offset the annual deficits and accumulating
national debt. The French used the same general methods as other Western allies to
increase the inflow of capital to finance their drawn out war, utilizing treasury bills
and war bonds. Clearly the financial demands to finance the War were so great that
their demand for capital could only be met through excessive borrowing.
iii) In his work The Economics of World War I in France author Pierre-Cyrille
Hautcoeur (2005, 199) explains that the effects of debt to finance the War would
prove devastating for the French economy, and this could be associated with the
long phase of financial instability that would plague the interwar era. The French
economy would clearly suffer as a result of the first European war, and it is
difficult to assess the full impact, which appears to have taken form as permanent
losses. For one, members of the French population were fractured, and the massive
loss of life clearly had an outsized effect on many from the working class. In total
2.41 million French men ended up as casualties of the War, and half were killed on
the Western Front.
Hautcoeur (2005, 199-200) explains that the only country that was affected
more dramatically with respect to loss of critical resources was Russia. Since most
of the fighting took place in France, after the armistice in November of 1918, it
was necessary to rebuild roads, homes. Still today some of the hills of Verdun
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remain off limits because of munitions that could still be accidently tripped to
explode. It is also worth noting that the size of France’s labor force stagnated,
remaining same. In contrast, over in America there was a large increase in
production and with women participating in the workforce. Inflation was a result of
increased and excessive borrowing, and France’s monetary authorities promoted
policies that encouraged prices to inflate as a method for reducing and diminishing
the size of the public debt. France’s central bank did retain most its importance
after the War; however, diminished deposits wielded effects over economic
outcomes. Unlike the post WWII conflict resolution, the end of WWI created an
era of mistrust and fear on the European continent. Hautcoeur (2005, 201) makes
his point that prewar France benefited from international relationships built over
years when France held a dominant position among nations. However after the
War, diplomacy as well as lending and borrowing were negatively affected. What
emerged was an era of autarky that spread across Europe, creating a situation
comparable to the Great Depression in that affected America in the 1930s.

The Data
i) Hautcoeur (2005, 170-172) teaches us that while the French assumed the
obligation to fund and fight the War, they did do without preparing for the
shocking effects associated with the length and brutality of industrialized warfare.
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The data offers a clear account of the effects the War from 1913-1920 on France.
From the onset in 1914, production in almost every category fell below the relative
rate in 1913. Understanding France’s production issues during the War translates
to America’s gain, and this is clearly the result of meeting increasing demands and
falling supplies in the French economy. French Industry as a whole fell to 68.1
percent of 1913 prewar levels and only recovered to 59.9 percent in 1920 (see
Table 6.1). These data suggests that France essentially unable able to initiate a until
decades later, after World War Two.
It is worth noting that in 1914, the first year of the War, Agricultural production
increased to 110.4 percent of 1913 levels, but immediately dropped to remain at
roughly 80 percent of prewar production levels. This can be partly attributed to
effects associated with German expansionism that claimed prime farmland. Then,
where main battles of the War were fought, was also considered some of the
richest land in all of France. This prime land was taken out of production. Raw
goods, such as iron, were devastated, and it should be no surprise that the demand
was unprecedented for the modern tools, equipment, and munitions required during
this new form of industrialized warfare. Iron production fell to 2.8 percent of 1913
production levels by 1915 and only recovered to 63.5 percent by 1920 (see Table
6.1). This trend in the observable data suggests that immediately after the War
France entered into an extended economic depression.
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ii) Houtcoeur (2005, 172) stresses there were three defining shocks that led to the
meltdown of the French economy immediately follows the beginning of the War.
The first registered as a broad economic shock that took place after increasing
government spending. The French government had increased spending from 5.1
billion francs in 1913 to a peak of 41.9 billion francs in 1918 (see Table 6.8). This
was only exacerbated by government income decreasing as the War progressed and
could be associated with rising deficits and the accumulation of a massive national
debt. Total debt grew from 33.5 billion to 197.5 billion francs from 1913 to 1920
(see Table 6.9). The next shock was the conscription that transformed laborers into
soldiers, and the losses associated with their absence from their workplaces. The
subsequent and permanent loss of life resulted in stagnant population growth after
the War that would only deepen the shock. This loss of life had a profound effect
on production and the distribution of labor in France. In 1913, the total population
registered at 39.8 million, and in 1914 this increases slightly to 41.8 million
growing at 4.7 percent per annum. However, once the carnage got underway, the
French population fell to 38.7 million by 1919 (see Table 6.15).
Houtcoeur (2005, 173-174) asserts that the French government made costly
mistakes in allocating workers. In 1914, 2.9 million men were sent to war out of
12.6 million working age males. The total would increase to 8.7 million mobilized
by the end of the War. With millions of soldiers deployed, the French government
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allocated resources based on older military theories, but quickly needed to increase
the armaments workforce which grew from 50 thousand workers to 1.7 million in
1918 (see Table 6.3). The last major shock that we shall consider registers as the
sum effect of decisions made by the French government, labor issues, and dramatic
supply and demand shifts generating effects. Nominal GDP increased to 313.7
percent of 1913 rates by 1920. However, real GDP fell to 77.3 percent over the
same period. Traumas that could be associated with the War, in combination with
falling wages crushed labor productivity in the private economy. Productivity
levels dropped to roughly half of their prewar levels by 1920 (see Table 6.14).
These shocks forced France to rely on trade and trading partners after the start of
the fighting, as a way to procure materials necessary for prosecuting the War.
iii) International trade proved essential to France during the War. Houtcoeur (2005,
180-183) explains that shocks to the economy were met with increasing trade,
specifically with the USA and the UK. Total imports as a percentage of 1913 levels
increased to 182 percent and 181 percent in 1916 and 1917 respectively. Imports
declined 114.8 percent by 1920 with the ending of the war, but remained above
prewar levels (see Table 6.7). The USA assumed responsibility for supplying a
good portion of France’s imports, with US supplies at 10.6 percent of the total in
1913, and rising to 35.5 percent of total trade at the peak in 1917. Imports from
the USA remained double their prewar total by 1920 (see Table 6.7).

13

14

Trade became concentrated through supporting the war effort. Houtcoeur (2005,
183-185) provides insights into spending patterns, showing that government
spending increased from 10 percent to 50 percent of GDP (see Table 6.8). Most of
this spending was earmarked for munitions imported from countries with the
available raw materials to produce this demand. To offer an idea of how the
military engagement led to increasing demand, I can note that but one field gun
could use 100,000 shells per day. The French government used ingenuity to
address trade and debt deficits by maintaining their currency exchange rate through
the purchase of foreign assets held by citizens. French leadership negotiated bonds
and debt instruments that could be purchased by the Allies, which would solidify
their relationship and foreign support. It was this relationship, and the reputation of
France, that protected the economy from sinking into a deeper depression or
greater inflation.

Conclusion
This inquiry sought to show that indeed World War One engendered profound
effects on and over France. Through a brief introduction to French life in the
prewar era, and the account of Louis Barthas, we can measure some of the
profound effects of the War by juxtaposing the prewar with the war and postwar
eras. It was argued and supported with data of the profound and devastating effets
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on the French population. One immediate effect was the death of the old world that
had associated ideals of glory with war, with members of the population being
crudely awakened to the horrors of industrialized war in the second decade of the
20th Century. The stagnation that took hold in France prior to the War, was
solidified by the deep traumas the French people experienced. The outcomes of the
War show up in the economy during and after the conflict, and are observable in
the data. Decreasing fertility rates, inflation, and a destruction of productivity all
support the idea of a deep and profound changes affecting France related to the
War. France was a great nation before the War but was devastated by the
unprecedented scale of warfare and the associated carnage and destruction. There
is a deeper argument to be made for the effects proximity has on those involved in
war, and the lasting effects large scale conflicts have had on those claiming the
European continent as their home.
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